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Chapter Title: Rethinking Japanese Feminism and the Lessons of Ūman Ribū: Toward a Praxis of Critical Transnational Feminism

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Book Title: Rethinking Japanese Feminisms

Book Editor(s): Julia C. Bullock, Ayako Kano and James Welker

Published by: University of Hawai'i Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv3zp07j.20>

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CHAPTER 12



Rethinking Japanese Feminism and the Lessons of *Ūman Ribu*

*Toward a Praxis of Critical
Transnational Feminism*

SETSU SHIGEMATSU

THIS ESSAY REFLECTS on the lessons of the 1970s Japanese women's liberation movement as a means to rethink Japanese feminism in relation to transnational feminism. By revisiting the history of this women's liberation movement—known as *ūman ribu*—I reflect on its contributions, limits, and contradictions as an example of radical Japanese feminism. More specifically, this chapter revisits *ūman ribu*'s approach to women and violence and considers how it contributes to rethinking power differences among feminists. The second half of the essay discusses Japanese feminism more broadly in relation to race, nationalism, and imperialism and interrogates the status of Japanese feminists in relation to non-Japanese feminists within Japan. By examining the lessons of *ūman ribu* and the limits of Japanese feminism, I put forward some notes toward a praxis of critical transnational feminism (CTF). This essay discusses the need for a critical transnational feminism to address power and hierarchies among feminists and feminisms. It is my hope that CTF can be a means to reflect on the methodologies and racialized epistemologies we utilize to research, represent, and exchange knowledge about Japanese feminism, and by extension, Japan and its (post) colonial conditions.

Ūman Ribu and Transnational Feminism

The rise of *ūman ribu* marked a watershed in the history of postwar feminism in Japan. Its newness or break from previous Japanese women's movements was characterized by its militancy against Japanese patriarchy, emphasis on women's sexuality, and women-centered cultural transformation, all of which are characteristics of radical feminism.¹ A new generation of Japanese women protested the sexist constraints of both existing student movements and New Left radicalism, and heralded an unprecedented gender critique of Japanese postwar society and the Japanese Left.²

From the beginning, activists adopted the loosely transliterated English phrase *ūman ribu* (woman lib) and *ribu* (lib) to name their movement, signaling their solidarity with other liberation movements as well as a turn toward the transnational. Although there were existing Japanese terms for women's liberation (*josei kaihō* and *fujin kaihō*, both combining terms meaning "woman" with a term meaning "liberation"), the utilization of this foreign *katakana* phrase *ūman ribu* marked a connection with, and a desire to be part of, a broader range of liberation movements that extended beyond Japan. Activists of the *ribu* movement engaged with feminists in the United States, Europe, and Asia. Their multiple modalities of cross-racial and cross-linguistic exchange included forms of recognition, (dis)identifications, solidarity, dialogue, interactions, and formal translation that can be understood as material and experiential practices of transnational feminism. This radical feminist movement was thus a hybrid formation constituted by domestic political conditions but also informed by the transnational and transcultural practices and movements of feminist knowledge.³

Over the last few decades, transnational feminism has been an expanding contemporary feminist paradigm that engages with global forces of capitalism, imperialism, and colonial modernity. Ongoing discussions and debates surrounding transnational feminism provide a productive arena to examine how the lessons and limits of *ūman ribu* and Japanese feminism can, in turn, illuminate our understanding of diverse feminisms as transnational and transcultural movements.

Transnational feminism, conceived as a critical response to Western cultural imperialism, builds on a genealogy of women of color, third world feminism, and postcolonial feminism.⁴ Paradigm-shifting interventions

by feminists such as Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa's *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color* (1983), Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmar's "Challenging Imperial Feminism" (1984), and Chandra Mohanty's "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse" (1991), are foundational works that articulate how racism, classism, heteronormativity, and geopolitical hegemony have constituted many Euro-American middle-class feminist endeavors and practices.⁵ Building on this feminist genealogy, which includes the work of Angela Davis, Gayatri Spivak, Kimberlé Crenshaw, M. Jacqui Alexander, and others, I take transnational feminism to involve an *intersectional* approach to feminist practice that accounts for how gender, race, ethnicity, class, and nation are constituted by imperialism and colonial modernity.⁶ That said, the question of how transnational feminism negotiates the material and institutional structures of first world power-knowledge formations, as well as Euro-American and Anglocentric epistemic hegemonies, requires further examination. Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan noted in 2001 that the very term "transnational" "has become so ubiquitous in cultural and critical studies that much of its political valence seems to have become evacuated."⁷ In the context of neoliberal globalization, feminists continue to debate the efficacy of the terms "transnational" and "transnational feminism."

Critical Transnational Feminism as Praxis

In their introduction to *Critical Transnational Feminist Praxis*, Richa Nagar and Amanda Lock Swarr emphasize the need to reassess the limits and contradictions of transnational feminism. This collection recognizes that transnational feminism "always runs the risk of unwittingly reinforcing the deeply problematic power relations that it seeks to disrupt."⁸ The editors advocate critical transnational feminism as an "inherently unstable praxis whose survival and evolution hinge on a continuous commitment to produce self-reflexive dialogic critiques of its own practices."⁹

Building on such understandings of transnational feminism, in what follows I elaborate a praxis of *critical transnational feminism* in dialogue with Japanese feminism. In my elaboration of critical transnational feminism, I underscore the criticality of the power differences within feminism. The *criticality* of power not only implies *persistent critique*, but also recognizes that transnational feminism faces an imminent crisis

due to the unexamined violences within its own system(s). The full recognition of power and aggression among feminists as constitutive and potentially abusive is vital. This criticality of power involves, on the one hand, a continual analysis of the material effects and personal impact of power differences and hierarchies among feminists/feminisms. On the other hand, this critical praxis emphasizes the imperative to openly address and (re)negotiate power differences. CTF acknowledges power differences and structural hierarchies as the extant condition of social relations, therefore endorsing the collective creation of discourses and practices to deal with the conflicts and ruptures that often arise due to power differences, aggression, racism, ableism, elitism, and heteronormativity among feminists.

CTF thus encourages dialogue between diverse feminisms and feminists in Japan, including non-Japanese feminists and other feminist/queer discourses. By engaging in dialogue with other feminisms in a transnational frame, we can place *ūman ribu* and Japanese feminism in conversation with queer women of color feminism and decolonial feminism. Such conversations raise the following questions: How are Japanese feminisms/feminists situated within a critical transnational feminist paradigm? How does Japan's history and status as a non-Western imperial power shape Japanese feminism (and its heteronormative/queer history)? How are different feminist subjects in Japan situated within larger global economies of race, nation, ethnicity, gender, and class, across the first world and third worlds, and do such questions matter?¹⁰ To what extent do the majority of feminists in Japan, as members of the ethnically and racially dominant group within the country, occupy a positionality analogous to that of white feminists in the United States? Are Japanese feminists in Japan similar to middle-class Euro-American feminists in terms of their relative privilege and racialized position? These kinds of questions engage with the critiques that have been posed by third world feminists, queer and women of color feminists, post- and decolonial feminist theory, and inform my understanding, positionality, and rethinking of Japanese feminism and transnational feminism.¹¹

CTF encourages dialogue about differences of power between U.S.-based knowledge production in English, and Japan's relative status as a regional and global power. How does Japan's historical relationship to the United States involve racialized forms of knowledge production? To what extent have scholars assessed how Japan Studies (as a historically

white- and male-dominated field) functions as an orientalizing discourse that racializes the Japanese within a global schema of race, whereby whiteness is still considered a “universal” vantage point that produces dominant discourses, putative objectivity, and “truth”? Have we adequately addressed how Japan is interpreted or co-figured, to recall Naoki Sakai’s analysis, through racialized discourses in relation to the West; how Japanese subjects and subjectivities can be caught in a conflicted desire to imitate, subvert, and overcome the whiteness of the West?¹² What are the political and discursive effects of an enduring legacy of knowledge production that remains predominantly Eurocentric in its utilization of theory?¹³ By moving out of area studies/nation-based models into a paradigm of CTF, we can raise different questions that hitherto have been deemed out of bounds, and, thereby, interrogate power and hierarchy within feminisms in Japan and beyond.

Nearly fifty years have passed since the emergence of *ūman ribu*. These decades have witnessed the diverse production of feminist discourses, debates, exchanges, and reflections on the legacy of the movement.¹⁴ In what follows, I begin by elaborating how *ūman ribu*’s lessons about women, feminism, and violence contribute toward a praxis of CTF. Then in the second half of this essay, I discuss Japanese feminism in relation to imperialism and race, informed by lessons from women of color and decolonial feminism. In doing so, I begin to answer some of the questions posed above. I hope that these provisional notes toward a praxis of CTF can be fruitful in rethinking Japanese feminism in a transnational frame.

A Self-Reflexive Feminist Analytics of Violence

The writings from the *ūman ribu* movement document moments of conflict and harm that enable an interrogation of hierarchical feminist relations as dynamic formations of solidarity and difference in power. The history of *ūman ribu*’s engagement with the problem of violence contributes to a praxis of CTF, not only because its activists challenged violence against women by men and the imperial-capitalist state, but because they engaged with violence *by* and *among* women. In *Scream from the Shadows: The Women’s Liberation Movement in Japan*, I describe the conditions of violence by and among women and feminists as an aporia of feminist thought.¹⁵ I contend that the manifestation of violence within,

among, and by women has not received adequate attention thus far in feminist studies due to the ways in which feminism has largely posited women as victims of patriarchal, masculinist, and sexist violence, and not its primary agents or key perpetrators. Insofar as women are ontologically situated within and also constituted by larger structures of patriarchal, capitalist, imperialist, racial, and gendered violence, women can and do engage and participate in violence and resistance to violence, often simultaneously. The following cases provide examples of how *ūman ribu* embraced the manifestation of violence among and by women as feminist concerns.

From the early years of the movement, *ribu* activists critically engaged with the phenomena of mothers who kill their children (*kogoroshi no onna*) and violence executed by women revolutionaries (in the United Red Army). Not only did *ribu* activists interrogate, connect with, and transform the discourse about maternal infanticide, but Tanaka Mitsu (b. 1943), *ūman ribu*'s most publicly visible activist, went so far as to frame abortion as a form of child killing.¹⁶ In doing so, she argued that what is commonly understood within feminist discourse as a "women's right" involves violence by women.¹⁷ Tanaka criticized the assumptions of liberal feminism, which has focused on a politics of rights and equality with men without often acknowledging the violent effects of asserting women's rights over others. The tenets of liberal feminism that promote and prioritize gender equality are often universalized as feminism. While liberal feminism has become the dominant form of feminism in the United States, many Japanese feminists have not necessarily aimed at equality with Japanese men as their political goal.¹⁸ According to influential narratives of Japanese feminism, progress from grassroots activism (such as *ūman ribu* in the 1970s) to the rise of academic and state feminism in the 1980s is often cast as a positive development.¹⁹ However, in our rethinking of Japanese feminism, we must be cautious of the compromises Japanese feminists make with the state.²⁰ Liberal reforms for women's equality have been selectively incorporated to serve capitalist and nationalistic economic agendas.²¹ Indeed, what was notable about *ribu*'s politics in its early phase was its critique of liberal feminism and its rejection of the state's strategies to control and police bodies, rejecting both the sexist gender binary and the ableism demanded by a capitalist state.

Ūman ribu's rejection of the state's dominant gender logic can be seen in its support of the women of the United Red Army, specifically its

female leader Nagata Hiroko. Despite the shocking impact of Nagata's leading role in killing fourteen of her comrades, *ribu* activists nonetheless embraced the manifestation of women enacting violence as a feminist concern.²² Even though they did not support Nagata's violence toward her comrades, they critiqued how society prohibits women from expressing violence and thus treats violent women as more heinous, criminal, and "inhuman" compared to men who engage in violence. By not positing women exclusively or primarily as nonviolent victims, but by recognizing their potential to be aggressors and capable of violence, *ūman ribu's* approach to women and their violence can contribute to a praxis of CTF. By establishing an understanding of women's participation and complicities in structures, systems, discourses, and acts of violence, this approach enables us to complicate our theorization of women, possessing various capacities and degrees of power to reproduce, perpetuate, prevent, disrupt, and resist various forms of violence and aggression.

Violence between Feminists as Contradiction? Micro-violence and Heteronormativity

In *To Women with Spirit: Toward a Disorderly Theory of Women's Liberation (Inochi no onnatachi e: Torimidashi ūman ribu ron, 1972)*, Tanaka Mitsu describes a moment of physical harm and violence she inflicted on another young activist named Sayama Sachi. Sayama joined *ribu* after running away from an abusive mother. In the early 1970s, Tanaka and Sayama lived with other activists as members of *ribu* communes. On one occasion, Tanaka hit Sayama for not properly turning off the gas.²³ At the time, Tanaka was twenty-seven and Sayama was nineteen. According to Sayama, Tanaka never apologized for how she treated her and the harm she experienced in their relationship was never addressed or resolved. A de facto power hierarchy in the movement arose despite *ribu's* anti-hierarchical feminist politics.²⁴ Sayama's experience of the power dynamics between them, as unequal and even abusive, continued decades later when *ribu* activists reunited to work on publishing documents from the movement.²⁵ In this case, the differences of power between Tanaka and Sayama were not racial, ethnic, or national, since both activists were Japanese women. However, their relative age, experience, writing skills, and prestige in the nascent movement constituted differences of power. These power differences were also gendered

insofar as Tanaka became regarded as “the man” (a domineering authority) and was called the “*tennō*” (emperor) of the movement by other feminists. After Tanaka left the movement to live in Mexico, Sayama and several other women began to identify as lesbians.²⁶ They felt freer to do so because previously Tanaka’s authority had maintained the heteronormative dominance within the movement. The homophobia and heteronormativity were forms of micro-violence and aggression among *ribu* activists addressed by James Welker’s chapter in this volume.

Feminist leaders can become very invested in their authority and use aggression and deploy other tactics to preserve their power. The root conflict between these two feminist activists was not in their age/gender difference or relative difference of power per se, but how that difference of power was expressed and negotiated. In many cases, the differences of power a priori are not the source of the concern, but rather, what is troubling is how power differentials are a means to (mis)treat, (dis)respect, and (de)value the other. Power difference is not always an inherent problem; what is needed is the continual assessment of the effects of power differences. How are power differences addressed, negotiated, and articulated, and an opportunity for mentoring or abuse? The inability and refusal to work through, confront, take account of, and heal from such conflictual incidents remain a feminist conundrum that causes the breakdown of relations in feminist movements. Therefore, feminists need to openly acknowledge and assess how power differences constitute intra-feminist relations. More importantly, a *praxis* of CTF is necessary to prevent, acknowledge, and reduce harm from these power differences and conflicts. CTF should entail a practice of open and continual discussion to decrease harm and to strategically negotiate and utilize power differences to achieve shared goals.

The commitment to analyze and address the complex conditions of violence and harm among women and feminists will be key in further developing a paradigm of CTF. If we assume that women are constituted within and through structures of violence (such as colonialism and racism), we can analytically move from the macro-structures of violence to micro-interpersonal instances of violence to better understand how they are inter-constituted. We can then assess how women’s complicities and contradictions are not necessarily anti-feminist per se, but an ineluctable part of any liberation struggle. A *praxis* of CTF should examine and

work through various kinds of microaggressions and macro-relational violences, whether they are physical, economic, psychological, symbolic, racial, or gendered. CTF thus advocates a self-reflexive feminist analytics of violence whereby subjects are understood as variously constituted through interlocking systems and histories of imperialism, capitalism, nationalism, racism, classism, ableism, and heteronormativity. CTF is therefore committed to illuminating the aporias of feminist thought and praxis even when this involves exposing the contradictory and conflictual contours of feminist histories and movements. In the next section, I address the macro-structures of national-imperial violence that divide and hierarchize women.

Japanese Imperialism, Feminism and Race

In *Feminism in Modern Japan*, Vera Mackie writes,

Feminist consciousness in Japan was forged as part of the development of a specific form of modernity. . . . Japanese modernity was also, however, a specific form of colonial modernity. Japanese culture was imbued with the features of a colonial and imperial power, and the identity of Japanese people was the identity of imperial subjects.²⁷

Following from an understanding that Japanese feminist consciousness was concomitant with the emergence of modern Japan as an imperial nation, we should ask how Japanese feminism has been shaped and constituted by Japanese imperialism.²⁸ If the very production of modern Japanese subjects has been entangled with Japanese imperialism, which in turn was a response to Western imperialism, then we can understand Japanese feminism as the product and outcome of a hybrid modernity forged within a global history of competing racialized national-imperialisms.²⁹ Indeed, the racialized dimensions of Japanese national-imperialism as it relates to Japanese feminism has been undertheorized. Since “Japanese” has been predominantly understood to constitute a national identity, the *racialized* identity of the Japanese has often remained unexamined and underarticulated in Japan Studies. To grasp the ideological roots of the racialized identity of the Japanese, it is useful to cite Bruce Armstrong’s “Racialisation and Nationalist Ideology”:

I wish to suggest that the concept of a national family, which was central to Japanese nationalism, contained the potential for the racialization of the imagined community which represented the Japanese nation. The notion that every Japanese subject was related “by blood” to all other Japanese subjects and that all members of the national family were collectively related “by blood” to the Emperor implied that the criteria for membership of the national community were both cultural *and* biological. With the appropriation, by theorists of Japanese colonialism, of racist arguments developed in the West, these criteria came to be understood as the defining features of the Japanese “race.”³⁰

Drawing on Robert Miles, Armstrong discusses how “racism and nationalism can be articulated such that a ‘race’ category and a national category effectively overlap or coincide.”³¹ Based on Japan’s history as a non-Western imperial power, Japan occupies a unique racialized position in a global schema of race and white supremacy. Although Japan attempted to challenge the white supremacist order of the British Empire and the United States as part of its propaganda, Japanese imperialists themselves produced discourses of Japanese racialized supremacy.³² Imperial-colonial discourses and practices of racial superiority were part of Japan’s propaganda and strategy to justify themselves as the supreme nation/race (*minzoku*) within a hierarchy of Asians. These racialized modalities of power were constitutive of Japanese conceptions of their status and identity in the world.³³

Despite the centrality of race to the modern global order, the racialized status of the Japanese has often been understudied as an aspect of Japanese identity and gender ideology.³⁴ To highlight the raciality of the Japanese as a non-white/yellow/East Asian competing (former) imperial power brings attention to the whiteness of the United States as the superpower of the West.³⁵ In regard to these racial tensions in the postwar period, Yukiko Koshiro writes that Japanese and American racism was not eradicated, but that the U.S. Occupation in many ways reinforced a racial hierarchy despite its implementation of a new system of democracy intended to properly modernize the Japanese.³⁶

The imperialist agenda of the United States and its brand of limited democracy significantly informed postwar Japanese feminism (and

catalyzed *ūman ribu*).³⁷ The U.S. imperial agenda in East Asia brought decades of militarization and war, while espousing “freedom and democracy.” Lisa Yoneyama has argued that the democratization policies and propaganda during the U.S. Occupation of Japan created an image of the United States as a liberator of Japanese women. Although the postwar Constitution and education system designed by the Americans asserted that men and women were entitled to equal political rights, these unprecedented civil rights were bestowed on Japanese women at the same time that formerly colonized populations in Japan were excluded from such political rights. Yoneyama writes,

the hypervisibility of Japanese women’s enfranchisement under the occupation was achieved *in exchange with* the invisibility of the disenfranchisement and elimination of the social and political rights of women and men from Japan’s former colonies, including their right to be considered Japanese nationals.³⁸

Yoneyama here reminds us that the relative “liberation” of Japanese women enabled through U.S. military occupation was achieved at the same time that former colonial subjects were summarily disenfranchised from their rights.³⁹ Yoneyama’s argument thus highlights how Japanese women were relatively empowered by enforcing a nationalist exclusion, imposed by the imperial power of the United States that re-divided and hierarchized Japanese women and colonial subjects.⁴⁰

Japanese thus functions not only as a nationality, but also as a *racialized* signifier of power and privilege that has been produced discursively and materially through historical structures of imperialism and capitalism. Koshiro writes that race came to have a double meaning, “race as manifested by physical appearance, and race as an explanation of national power and status in the world.”⁴¹ After its postwar recovery, Japan’s rising economic power through the 1960s secured its recognition as an advanced first world nation. The treatment of Japanese as “honorary whites” in apartheid South Africa in the 1960s attests to how Japan’s imperial legacy and relative global economic power manifest through racial logics.⁴² The treatment of Japanese as whites by white South Africans demonstrates how whiteness as property and identity operates through logics of inclusion and exclusion. As Cheryl Harris has

stated, “The right to exclude was the central principle, too, of whiteness as identity, for whiteness in large part has been characterized not by an inherent unifying characteristic but by the exclusion of others deemed to be ‘not white.’”⁴³ Japan’s proximity to whiteness within a global racial order can be further elaborated in relation to the racialized status of Japanese women in Japan compared with non-Japanese subjects.

The Racialized Ethnic Status of Japanese Women: Exclusivity and Hierarchy

As a researcher of Japanese feminism, I have been asked by scholars in other fields whether Japanese women are analogous in their racialized position within Japan to that of white women in the United States. If Japanese women occupy or approximate such a privileged status, what are the implications in regards to Japanese feminism? This question about Japanese women’s relative whiteness and racialization is *not exclusively* about the phenotype of Japanese vis-à-vis other races and Asians, but is also about relative power and status.⁴⁴ For example, in contrast to visible phenotypic or epidermal distinctions between South Asians and Southeast Asians, such racial markers do not necessarily apply among Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans. Rather, racialization here operates *discursively*, producing political logics that are linked, in this context, with socioeconomic privilege and civil rights of Japanese women as members of the dominant ethnic majority in a postcolonial society. To date, these issues have not been addressed with frequency in academic work or feminist literature; however, scholars such as Sonia Ryang, Jung Yeong-hae, and Kim Puja have addressed such dynamics in this national-racialized feminist power structure.

Taking a postcolonial feminist perspective, Sonia Ryang has critiqued how Japanese feminism has tended to exclude non-Japanese women and reinforce the myth of homogeneity. Ryang writes,

Contemporary Japanese feminism has long been predominantly “nation-focused” and ethnocentric, concerned mainly with Japanese women in Japan. . . . By not focusing properly on discriminations based on gender *and* ethnicity, Japanese feminism has effectively condoned the dominant Japanese ideology of national homogeneity.⁴⁵

Following Ryang, to focus on the *single axis of gender* and to ignore other power axes such as ethnicity and race produces a feminist hierarchy. This hierarchy privileges the kind of feminism that prioritizes gender issues for Japanese women, without marking Japanese as a specific ethnic/racial identity. This is analogous to white feminism in the United States. Similar to women of color in the United States, colonized subjects such as Ainu (indigenous people of the north of Japan), Okinawans, Korean, Chinese, and Taiwanese residents continue to face various forms of racialized and class discrimination within Japan, making their struggles intersectional, involving multiple discriminations, as documented by Akwi Seo's chapter. The ways in which Japanese feminists can focus on and often limit their concerns to gender issues is a result of a structure of ethnic and class privilege. One Okinawan feminist states,

[Many Japanese] feminists have not acknowledged their privilege and historical oppression against Okinawans. They are sensitive about it and struggle to face their privilege. A conversation about the fact that Japan is a heterogeneous nation that colonized other nations needs to continue among transnational Japanese feminists so that they can be better allies to non-Japanese.⁴⁶

In response to such criticisms, Japanese feminists have sought to mitigate such limits and exclusions by including the voices of "minority women" and "minority feminist criticism" in their publications.⁴⁷ The inclusion of "minority women" within a nation-state-based paradigm, however, results in the continued structural and discursive dilemma whereby the majority dominates and dictates who the minority is. Insofar as transnational feminism does not necessarily disrupt the logics of the nation-state that often privilege dominant ethnic groups within a national framework, CTF calls for a fundamental questioning and unsettling of the assumptions of nationalism and the analytic boundaries of the nation-state and its logic.

In "Racism Among Feminists," Jung Yeong-hae forwards a powerful argument against feminists who label the other as a minority. She opens her essay with incisive questions that continue to have relevance for dominant paradigms of Japanese feminism. Jung asks, "Who decides 'who is the minority?' Those who self-identify as the 'minority'? Or those who call the other the 'minority'?" Jung argues that those feminists who call

the other the minority are deploying a “mechanism and power structure that give themselves the superior and universal position.”⁴⁸ This indictment would apply to many Japanese feminists (myself included) who have re-produced this naming and labeling of “minority” while belonging to the majority.

Jung goes on to decry the reproduction of “white supremacy” (*haku-jin shijōshugi*) in feminism that claims that the origins of modern feminism lie with white middle-class feminism based on Eurocentric narratives about first- and second-wave feminism.⁴⁹ Jung demonstrates how racism has operated among U.S. white middle-class feminists to exclude black feminists and she posits Japanese women in Japan as analogous to white women in the United States in terms of their civil rights.⁵⁰ Tomomi Yamaguchi and Becky Thompson have also pointed out the problems of using the term second wave, noting how it privileges white middle-class feminists as the pivotal agents of feminist history.⁵¹

Hegemonic feminist paradigms about first and second wave have been adopted and canonized within Japanese academic feminism. For example, the opening volume of Iwanami Shoten’s series, *Feminism in Japan*, begins by placing *ūman ribu* as the beginning of “second-wave feminism” (*dai ni ha feminizumu*) in Japan.⁵² This collection, edited by influential feminist scholars Ehara Yumiko, Inoue Teruko, and Ueno Chizuko, (re)produces the dominant master narrative of white-feminist waves and categorizes colonized subjects in Japan as “minorities.” The adoption and investment in paradigms of white middle-class feminism by Japanese feminists is also then related to questions of translation. As part of the theory of CTF, I would underscore the importance of further analyzing how racialized economies of translation operate in conjunction with modalities of imperialism and axes of race, ethnicity, class, and gender. What kind of hierarchies are reinforced through economies of translation and publication?⁵³ Do Japanese feminist exchanges and translations that privilege Euro-American feminism reinforce first world hegemonies?

Given this kind of criticism, what changes can scholars of Japanese feminism and (Japanese) feminists make? CTF emphasizes greater dialogue and solidarity between different forms of feminist discourse, in this case, between Japanese feminists and non-Japanese feminists in Japan, as well as with feminists beyond Japan. Queer women of color feminism in the United States and non-Japanese/ethnic feminists illuminate the

limits, exclusions, and hierarchies (re)produced by dominant paradigms of white/Japanese feminism. Rather than reproducing the categories of majority versus minority feminism, a paradigm of CTF would interrogate how transnational feminism can perpetuate (neo)imperial-colonial relations and/or commit to an anti-imperialist or decolonial politics.

Since the late 1970s, one ongoing trajectory of Japanese feminism has been Pan-Asian feminism, which has aimed to support and build solidarity with Asian women from Japan's former colonies. Although lines of cross-ethnic solidarity were not immediately cultivated during the early 1970s, an anti-imperialist understanding has shaped how many *ūman ribu* activists and other Japanese feminists have invested in solidarity work with third world Asian women. By the mid-1970s, for example, *ribu* activists and other Japanese feminists protested against Japanese men who were going to Korea on sex tours. They did this as an expression of their anti-imperialist feminism and as an act of solidarity with Korean women who were protesting in Korea.⁵⁴ The Asian Women's Association (AWA) emerged from coalitional feminist organizing against sex tourism in Asian countries by Japanese businessmen.⁵⁵ Matsui Yayori (1935–2002) was a leader in founding the AWA in 1977 and a key feminist leader in organizing the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery.

During the 1990s, the debates surrounding the “comfort women” marked a turning point in Japanese feminism. According to Ulrike Wöhr, during the 1990s, “Just as ‘white’ feminists in North America and Europe have had to face the challenge of postcolonial feminisms, mainstream Japanese feminists could no longer evade the questions put to them by women of other ethnicities and nationalities residing within Asia, and even within Japan.”⁵⁶ The feminist debates about the “comfort women” were very complicated and highlighted divisions among feminists in Japan. Wöhr describes how these divisions also came to represent debates among “majority Japanese feminists” like Ueno Chizuko vis-à-vis feminists such as Kim Puja, who argued from the perspective of a Korean feminist living in Japan. Ueno was accused by other intellectuals and activists of espousing “universalist” views and advocating a feminist hierarchy that places the importance of gender *above* ethnicity.⁵⁷ In contrast, Kim Puja represented a Korean-Japanese standpoint arguing for the recognition of colonial violence, and that “sisterhood” and “solidarity” would only be possible after Japanese women admitted their guilt

and complicity as daughters of the colonizing nation.⁵⁸ Recognizing the ongoing historical effects of colonialism is a vital foundation for understanding the politics of decolonial feminism.

Feminism, Anti-imperialism, and the Decolonial

Contemporary critiques of Japanese feminism's national-racialized exclusivity are also pertinent to *ūman ribu*'s limitations in its early stage. Although many *ūman ribu* activists were informed by the anti-imperialist discourse of the New Left, seeking solidarity with colonized women within Japan was not considered imperative to Japanese women's liberation during the early 1970s. Many felt that the first step was to liberate themselves; therefore, organizing with women who are ethnic Korean, Ainu, Okinawan, or Buraku (a traditionally discriminated against caste) was not initially integral to *ribu*'s politics. Among *ribu* activists I interviewed, there was suspicion about "fronting" a rhetoric of solidarity with these groups in reaction to how such practices characterized the male dominated New Left student movements that *ribu* women deemed hypocritical due to their sexism.⁵⁹ Rather, some *ribu* activists identified themselves as analogous to these oppressed groups and went so far as to describe Japanese women as "colonized slaves" within the imperial nation of Japan.⁶⁰ Citing Angela Davis, a pamphlet by Group of Fighting Women (Gurūpu Tatakau Onna) describes the relations between Japanese women and Japanese men as that of a "slave" and "slave master."⁶¹ This was similar to how radical white feminists adopted the language of African Americans and saw themselves as oppressed by men (as "slaves" to men) and targets of their sexual violence.⁶² The circulation and resignification of such political discourse is also an example of transnational flows of feminist discourse from the United States to Japan that gloss over and/or ignore racial differences.

White feminist discourses that privilege gender over racial/ethnic difference would characterize Japanese feminism as it developed into liberal feminism and academic feminism during the late 1970s and 1980s. Yoko Ono is an apt example of this form of universalizing global feminism and a transnational symbol of the merging of Euro-American and Japanese feminist discourses that appropriate black experiences. She famously stated in 1969 that "Woman is the nigger of the world" and later released a song with John Lennon with this title and theme. Echoing

the discourse of Euro-American abolitionists and suffragettes, Ono's statement at once conflates the oppression and de facto enslavement of Africans with the oppression of *all women*, and appropriates this suffering to render the plight of all women as somehow commensurate, similar, or analogous. Moreover, in 1972 the National Organization of Women (NOW) presented Ono and Lennon with the "Positive Image of Women" award for the song's "strong feminist statement." Ono's discourse and recognition from NOW highlight a convergence of white feminism and Japanese raciality. Ono's image decorated the cover of Japan's inaugural edition of the first commercial feminist magazine, *Feminisuto* (Feminist), which sold 22,000 copies in 1977. Founder and editor of *Feminisuto*, Atsumi Ikuko, describes this new Japanese feminist magazine as "five years behind American feminists," referring specifically to the publication of *Ms. Magazine* in 1972.⁶³ This Japanese-English bilingual publication was representative of the transnational circuits of Japanese feminism that invested in connections with Euro-American feminists. As arguably the most famous Japanese woman across the United Kingdom, United States, and Japan at the time, Ono's discourse and image symbolize the multivalent *transnational* connections between Euro-American feminism and Japanese feminism.

Thus, a vital question that CTF raises is the following: When does the transnational function to normalize the status quo, and when does it serve to decolonize power relations?⁶⁴ Following from this question, an analytical distinction to make is whether the *trans* in transnational feminism is queer/(non)heteronormative and guided by an anti-imperialist politics or a desire to further strengthen one's position by an appeal to the cultural capital of the West. When transnational feminist solidarities remain between first world nations, we might ask if these connections reproduce imperial forms of power. If transnational feminist practices are not anti-imperialist or decolonial, do they run the risk of reproducing neo-imperial forms of feminism?

As a final point, I make an analytical distinction between Japanese first world anti-imperialism and decolonial praxis.⁶⁵ I make this distinction because the former did not necessarily translate into anti-imperial solidarity work with other colonized women in Japan. A decolonial feminist politics would involve solidarity work with (formerly) colonized women/feminists, whereby first world (Japanese) feminists would *support* rather than lead and determine the political agenda. Hence CTF

advocates a shift from an open-ended transnational perspective, which often reproduces the dominant logics of the nation-state, to a decolonial feminist trajectory, which focuses on solidarity that traverses and unsettles axes of power and (post)colonial logics of violence. Decolonial feminism recognizes that colonial logics structure, contour, and haunt contemporary conditions and that the process of decolonization is unfinished, always imperfect, and requires creative and strategic alliances.

Conclusion

These preliminary thoughts about a praxis of CTF are indebted to lessons drawn from the *ūman ribu* movement. By revisiting *ūman ribu*'s limits and seeming contradictions, we are reminded that various forms of violence within and among feminists can be productively reconceived as opportunities to better address power abuse and aggression among women. Such a feminist politics would involve an understanding that these kinds of constitutive contradictions contribute to a better praxis of CTF *if* feminists prioritize the importance of communicating openly about existing structural conflicts, and *create effective ways* to work through them. Differences of power and hierarchy need not be deemed antithetical to feminism and obscured, but rather should be openly discussed as the extant material conditions that require transformation. CTF thus aims to practice and theorize counter-hegemonic logics without presuming an absence of contradiction and conflict. By analyzing and working through the multiplicity of violences within feminist formations and histories, we may discover a new approach to power within feminism. Power differences among feminists within a transnational context need not be an impediment to coalition, but rather provide a basis for a praxis of CTF that recognizes exposing and harnessing the potential violence of feminist power as imperative for the future of feminisms.

Notes

I thank Ayako Kano, James Welker, Tamara Ho, Dylan Rodriguez, Akwi Seo, Tomomi Yamaguchi, and Ayano Ginoza for their comments on this chapter.

- 1 *Ūman ribu*'s call for comprehensive political, economic, social, cultural, and sexual revolution, constitutes what has been defined as “radical

- feminism.” See Machiko Matsui, “Evolution of the Feminist Movement in Japan,” *National Women’s Studies Association Journal* 2, no. 3 (1990).
- 2 Setsu Shigematsu, *Scream from the Shadows: The Women’s Liberation Movement in Japan* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).
 - 3 In part 1 of *Scream from the Shadows*, “Genealogies and Violations,” I elaborate multiple domestic and transnational political genealogies that intersected to shape the emergence of the *ribu* movement.
 - 4 Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan ask “how to link diverse feminisms without requiring either equivalence or a master theory . . . without replicating cultural and economic hegemony.” See “Introduction,” in *Scattered Hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practices*, ed. Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 19.
 - 5 Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color* (New York: Kitchen Table, 1983); Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmar, “Challenging Imperial Feminism,” *Feminist Review*, no. 17 (Autumn 1984); Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse,” in *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, ed. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).
 - 6 Angela Davis, *Women, Race and Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1983); Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,” *Stanford Law Review* 43, no. 6 (1991); M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, eds., *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism,” *Critical Inquiry* 12, no. 1 (Autumn 1985); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Women in Difference,” in her *Outside the Teaching Machine* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 77–95.
 - 7 Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan, “Global Identities: Theorizing Transnational Studies of Sexuality,” *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 7, no. 4 (2001).
 - 8 Richa Nagar and Amanda Lock Swarr, “Introduction: Theorizing Transnational Feminist Praxis,” in *Critical Transnational Feminist Praxis* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010), 17.
 - 9 *Ibid.*, 9.
 - 10 In her “Under Western Eyes Revisited,” in *Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 227, Chandra Mohanty complicates the usage of the terms first world and third world to account for the socioeconomic differences,

social majorities, and social minorities within these sites. However, I chose to continue to use the terms first world and third world, despite their limitations, for their political significance about the legacy and ongoing conditions of colonialism.

- 11 As a scholar born in Japan to Japanese parents, but raised and educated in England, Canada, and the United States, I am invested in feminism as a transnational and decolonial political project for gender liberation. I have learned and benefited from the movements of women's liberation across North America and Japan, and have been formed by these genealogies of struggle. I write as part of these genealogies and self-reflexive of my own power position within this global framework as someone situated in the U.S. academy who publishes primarily in English as an imperial language.
- 12 Naoki Sakai, "The Problem of 'Japanese Thought': The Formation of 'Japan' and the Schema of Cofiguration," in his *Translation and Subjectivity: On "Japan" and Cultural Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 40–71.
- 13 Ayako Kano, "Toward a Critique of Transhistorical Femininity," in *Gendering Modern Japanese History*, ed. Barbara Molony and Kathleen Uno (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). Kano cites from a collection of letters Ueno Chizuko exchanged with philosopher Nakamura Yūjiro included in Ueno Chizuko, *'Ningen' o koete: Idō to chakuchi* (Tokyo: Seidosha, 1989), 207–209.
- 14 *Inpakushon*, no. 73, "Ribu nijū nen," special issue (1992); Onnatachi no Ima o Tou Kai, ed., *Zenkyōtō kara ribu e* (Tokyo: Inpakuto Shuppankai, 1996); Kanō Mikiyo, *Ribu to iu kakumei: Kindai no yami o hiraku* (Tokyo: Inpakuto Shuppankai, 2003), 57–69.
- 15 Shigematsu, *Scream from the Shadows*, 14.
- 16 Tanaka Mitsu, "Aete teiki suru = chūzetsu wa kitoku no kenri ka?" in *Shiryō Nihon ūman ribu shi*, vol. 2, ed. Mizoguchi Akiyo, Saeki Yōko, and Miki Sōko (Kyoto: Shōkadō Shoten, 1994), 63.
- 17 Shigematsu, *Scream from the Shadows*, 28.
- 18 Alexander and Mohanty contrast their approach to feminism with the "liberal-pluralist understanding of feminism" which they describe as "an inheritance from the predominantly liberal roots of American feminist praxis." See Alexander and Mohanty, "Introduction," in their *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures*, xvi. See also Yoshie Kobayashi, *A Path Toward Gender Equality: State Feminism in Japan* (New York: Routledge, 2012).
- 19 Ehara Yumiko describes the development of Japanese feminism from the 1970s to the 1990s in terms of three major phases: "the era of liberation" (1970–1977), characterized by activism, including *ūman ribu*; the

- “emergence of Women’s Studies” (1978–1982); and an “era of celebrated feminists and feminist debate” that followed. Ehara’s narrative points to some of the historical tensions between *ūman ribu* activists and academic feminists, and some of the hierarchies and conflicts within Japanese feminism that have often juxtaposed academia versus activism and theory versus practice. See Ehara Yumiko, “Japanese Feminism in the 1970s and 1980s,” trans. Yanagida Eino and Paula Long, *U.S.–Japan Women’s Journal*, no. 4 (1993). I also address these tensions in my “Epilogue” to *Scream from the Shadows*, 171–175.
- 20 Such compromises and the dangers thereof are discussed in chapters by Elyssa Faison, Ayako Kano, and Tomomi Yamaguchi in this volume.
- 21 Patricia Boling, “State Feminism in Japan?” *U.S.–Japan Women’s Journal*, no. 34 (2008). See also Kano’s comments regarding Abe Shinzo’s “womenomics” in the conclusion to this volume.
- 22 Setsu Shigematsu, “The Japanese Women’s Liberation Movement and the United Red Army,” *Feminist Media Studies* 12, no. 2 (2012).
- 23 Shigematsu, *Scream from the Shadows*, 160; Tanaka Mitsu, *Inochi no onnatachi e: Torimidashi ūman ribu ron* (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1972), 98–99; Sayama Sachi, interview with author, San Francisco, June 7, 2001.
- 24 Sayama, interview, June 7, 2001.
- 25 Sayama Sachi, personal correspondence and interviews, 2010–2015.
- 26 In contrast with U.S. and other radical feminist movement(s), Tanaka did not promote “lesbian love”—a term sometimes used in Japan in the early 1970s—as an alternative to compulsory heterosexuality. As noted in James Welker’s chapter in this volume, lesbians were marginalized within the *ribu* movement. This was also one of *ribu*’s limitations despite its central slogan that called for the liberation of eros. Tanaka and other activists I interviewed spoke of the irony of Tanaka becoming “the man” and “*tennō*” (emperor) of the movement insofar as she became the dominant authority and decision maker in the movement.
- 27 Vera Mackie, *Feminism in Modern Japan: Citizenship, Embodiment and Sexuality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2–3.
- 28 Suzuki Yūko, *Feminizumu to sensō: Fujin undōka no sensō kyōryoku* (Tokyo: Marujusha, 1997); Kanō Mikiyo, *Josei to tennōsei* (Tokyo: Shisō no Kagaku, 1979).
- 29 Vera Mackie, *Feminism in Modern Japan*; Sharon L. Sievers, *Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983).
- 30 Bruce Armstrong, “Racialisation and Nationalist Ideology: The Japanese Case,” *International Sociology* 4, no 3 (1989): 338.
- 31 *Ibid.*, 340.

- 32 John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1987); Gerald Horne, *Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 2004).
- 33 Japan's relative whiteness and its shifting racialized discourses changed over the course of its empire-building project. See Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 7; and Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).
- 34 Gerald Horne, "The Asiatic Black Man? Japan and the 'Colored Races' Challenge White Supremacy," in *Black Renaissance/Renaissance Noire* 4, no. 1 (2002): 26–37.
- 35 Moon-Kie Jung, Joao H. Costa Vargas, and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, eds., *State of White Supremacy: Racism, Governance and the United States* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). Dylan Rodriguez has argued that we are no longer in an era of "'classical' white supremacy as a model of dominance based on white bodily monopoly" but that it is a "sophisticated, flexible, 'diverse' (neoliberal)" form of multicultural white supremacy that selectively incorporates people of color to further its logic of violence. See Dylan Rodriguez, "Inaugurating Multicultural White Supremacy," *Journal for Critical Alternatives*, November 9, 2008, <http://criticalalternatives.blogspot.com/2008/12/inaugurating-multicultural-white.html>.
- 36 Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms*, 16; Gerald Horne, *Race War!*; Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Jodi Kim, "Asian America's Japan: the Perils of Gendered Racial Rehabilitation," in *Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010), 95–142.
- 37 The postwar Constitution and education system designed by the Americans asserted that men and women were entitled to equal political rights. In spite of legal equality, these formal rights were mitigated and undermined by limited reforms of the Civil Code, the family registration system (*koseki seido*) and sociocultural discourses that continued to regulate and reproduce patriarchal gender norms and other forms of discrimination. These contradictory conditions catalyzed the rise of *ūman ribu*.
- 38 Lisa Yoneyama, "Liberation Under Siege: US Military Occupation and Japanese Women's Enfranchisement," *American Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (2005): 905 (emphasis in the original).

- 39 See Akwi Seo's chapter for more details on Koreans' loss of rights during the U.S. Occupation.
- 40 When we consider the rise of feminism in the United States and Japan as part of modern histories of imperial powers, we can compare how colonized people became "minoritized" within these nations.
- 41 Koshiro, *Transpacific Racism*, 3.
- 42 Masako Osada, *Sanctions and Honorary Whites: Diplomatic Policies and Economic Realities in Relations between Japan and South Africa* (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing, 2002), 145. Although the term "honorary whites" was never used in official or legal language in South Africa, it began to be widely used to describe the exceptional treatment that Japanese received in South Africa, such as being allowed to live in white-only areas.
- 43 Cheryl Harris, "Whiteness as Property," in *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement*, ed. Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas (New York: The New Press, 1995), 283.
- 44 Setsu Shigematsu, "Intimacies of Imperialism and Japanese-Black Feminist Transgression: Militarised Occupations in Okinawa and Beyond." *Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific* 37 (2015), <http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue37/shigematsu.pdf>.
- 45 Sonia Ryang, "Love and Colonialism in Takamure Itsue's Feminism," *Feminist Review* 60 (1998): 2 (emphasis in the original).
- 46 "A-san," interview, January 1, 2016. Suzuki Mieko, a Buraku activist, similarly states, "I think that Japanese feminists have a limited perspective. . . . The economic and social background of these 'middle-class feminists,' and, consequently, their perspectives, are also very different from those of the Buraku women. Recognizing these differences is crucial. I think that feminists in Japan are lacking in terms of their understanding of minority issues and the structure of discrimination." See Suzuki Mieko, "Commitments to Women's and Buraku Issues," in *Voices from the Japanese Women's Movement*, ed. AMPO, *Japan Asia Quarterly Review* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 156.
- 47 For example, in AMPO, *Voices from the Japanese Women's Movement*, three out of twenty-six chapters provide women's perspectives from Buraku, ethnic Korean, and Ainu communities.
- 48 Jung Yeong-hae, "Feminizumu no naka no reishizumu," in *Wādomappu feminizumu*, ed. Ehara Yumiko and Kanai Yoshiko (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1997), 89. I thank Ayako Kano for directing me to this important essay on racism within feminism.
- 49 Jung, "Feminizumu no naka no reishizumu," 97. See also Becky

- Thompson, "Multiracial Feminism: Recasting the Chronology of Second Wave Feminism," *Feminist Studies* 28, no. 2 (2002).
- 50 Jung, "Feminizumu no naka no reishizumu," 100.
- 51 I thank Tomomi Yamaguchi for raising this point in 2000 when we were part of an *ūman ribu* research group in Tokyo. See also, Thompson, "Multiracial Feminism."
- 52 Ehara Yumiko, Inoue Teruko, and Ueno Chizuko, eds., *Nihon no feminizumu*, vol. 1: *Ribu to feminizumu* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009), i. This series is also discussed by Ayako Kano in her chapter in this volume.
- 53 Questions about English-language hegemony and translation are raised by the very language and form of this essay, but it is beyond the limits of this essay to address them adequately.
- 54 *Ribu* activists embodied and lived their politics for decades and many committed to Pan-Asian feminist practice that was intended to build solidarity with women from nations formerly colonized by Japan. For example, Kuno Ayako, editor of *Women's Mutiny* (*Onna no hangyaku*), a *ribu* publication (*minikomi*) that continued for forty years, became a volunteer at a shelter specifically for Filipina women living in Japan. Miki Sōko, another veteran *ribu* activist, became very involved in supporting Korean women's filmmaking during the 1990s and early 2000s.
- 55 See the Asia–Japan Women's Resource Center's website: <http://www.ajwrc.org/eng/index.php>, last accessed March 10, 2015. The Asia–Japan Women's Resource Center continues this legacy of Pan-Asian Japanese feminist practice. The anti-imperialist feminist politics that shapes the Pan-Asian feminist movement of groups, such as AWA and AJWRC, involves a sustained practice of anti-imperialist feminism.
- 56 Ulrike Wöhr, "A Touchstone for Transnational Feminism: Discourses on the Comfort Women in 1990s Japan," *Japanstudien* 16 (2004): 66.
- 57 Oka Mari, "Watashitachi wa naze mizukara nanoru koto ga dekiru no ka: shokuminchishugi-teki kenryoku kankei ni tsuite no oboegaki," in *Shinpojiumu: Nashonarizumu to 'ianfu' mondai*, ed. Nihon no Sensō Sekinin Shiryō Sentā (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1998), 221–223.
- 58 Ikeda Eriko, Kim Puja, Nishino Rumiko, Nakahara Michiko, and Matsui Yayori, "Zadankai: Naze 'josei kokusai senpan hōtei' o hiraku no ka," *Onnatachi no 21seiki* 17 (January 1999): 6.
- 59 Gurūpu Tatakau Onna, "Naze sei kaihō ka: Josei kaihō no mondai teiki," in *Shiryō Nihon ūman ribu shi*, vol. 1, ed. Mizoguchi Akiyo, Saeki Yōko, and Miki Sōko (Kyoto: Shōkadō Shoten, 1992), 212.
- 60 Gurūpu Tatakau Onna, "Naze ribu wa nyūkan o tatakau ka," in *Shiryō Nihon ūman ribu shi*, vol. 1.
- 61 *Ibid.*, 238.

- 62 Sara Evans, *Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left* (New York: Vintage Books, 1980). Evans' work is an example of this form of white feminism.
- 63 Kathryn Tolbert, "Feminist Magazines Appear in Japan," *Herald Tribune*, November 25, 1977, 17B.
- 64 M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Cartographies of Knowledge and Power: Transnational Feminism and Radical Praxis," in *Critical Transnational Feminist Praxis*, 24.
- 65 For a further distinction between Japanese anti-imperial feminism and decolonial feminism, see Shigematsu, "Intimacies of Imperialism and Japanese-Black Feminist Transgression."